Signaling Via an Agenda in Multi-Issue Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Posted: 3 Jun 1999

See all articles by Lutz-Alexander Busch

Lutz-Alexander Busch

University of Waterloo - Department of Economics; University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics

Ignatius J. Horstmann

University of Toronto - Institute for Policy Analysis; University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Abstract

While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved, the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order, typically simultaneously. This paper shows that, when there is incomplete information, such an approach removes an important avenue for information transmission: the bargaining agenda itself. Compared to the standard model, pooling on offers by the informed is reduced and a signaling equilibrium arises when the agenda is determined endogenously. Signaling is carried out by use of an issue-by-issue bargaining agenda.

JEL Classification: C78, D82

Suggested Citation

Busch, Lutz-Alexander and Horstmann, Ignatius J. and Horstmann, Ignatius J., Signaling Via an Agenda in Multi-Issue Bargaining with Incomplete Information. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=161372

Lutz-Alexander Busch (Contact Author)

University of Waterloo - Department of Economics ( email )

Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1
Canada
519-888-4567 ext. 5229 (Phone)
519-725-0530 (Fax)

University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics ( email )

London, Ontario N6A 5B8
Canada
519-679-2111x(5323) (Phone)

Ignatius J. Horstmann

University of Toronto - Institute for Policy Analysis ( email )

140 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G6
Canada

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/ihorstmann

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