Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries

61 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2010 Last revised: 1 Oct 2010

See all articles by Kevin E. Davis

Kevin E. Davis

New York University School of Law

Anna Gelpern

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: June 1, 2010

Abstract

Private actors channel capital to inhabitants of developing countries through a growing variety of intermediaries. Some of those intermediaries operate much like conventional charities, some operate more like for-profit financial institutions, yet others combine features of these models. The last category is growing fast. It also holds the promise of integrating foreign aid and private development finance to bring diversification opportunities for investors, new funding for development, and creative ways to improve development outcomes. Considering the potential reach of such hybrid finance, determining the appropriate regulatory framework for it is an important challenge, which joins policy debates about regulating financial innovation, consumer financial protection, and revitalizing foreign assistance after the global economic crisis. This paper takes up that challenge by canvassing the regulatory frameworks currently applied to charities, banks and investment intermediaries; identifying the problems with the regulatory discontinuities created by the status quo; and suggesting reforms.

Suggested Citation

Davis, Kevin E. and Gelpern, Anna, Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries (June 1, 2010). N.Y.U. Journal of Int'l Law & Polotics, Vol. 42, p. 1209, 2010, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-22, American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2010-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1618859

Kevin E. Davis (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Vanderbilt Hall, Room 335
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-992-8843 (Phone)

Anna Gelpern

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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