Due Process in Civil Commitments
Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 68, 2011
Loyola University Chicago School of Law Research Paper No. 2010-007
55 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2010 Last revised: 12 Nov 2014
Date Written: June 24, 2010
Abstract
One of the Roberts Court's most controversial cases, United States v. Comstock (2010), expanded the powers of mental health workers to indefinitely commit patients. The majority in that case found an intermediate level of judicial proof constitutionally sufficient to intern persons under the federal civil commitment statute. The law provides for the post-sentencing confinement of anyone proven by “clear and convincing evidence” to be mentally ill and dangerous. The statute relies on a standard established by the Court more than thirty years before. The majority in Comstock missed the opportunity to reassess its earlier holding in light of recent psychiatric studies indicating that the ambiguity of available diagnostic tools can lead to erroneous insanity assessments and mistaken evaluations about patients’ likelihood to engage in dangerous activities.
In this article, I contend that the “clear and convincing standard” of proof inadequately protects patients’ due process rights because civil commitment hearings can result in severe deprivations of liberty. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, more commonly associated with criminal cases, is in order because it requires a closer evaluation of the facts, law, and constitutional norms. The multidisciplinary approach I pursue offers a unique framework for resolving a social problem that has been inadequately described in extant legal and psychiatric writings. I reflect on Supreme Court precedents in light of psychiatric studies about the limited reliability of emergency commitments and set out a standard adopted from criminal proceedings to better prevent unnecessary mental hospitalization.
Part 1 of the article sets out some of the core problems with the current standard for civil commitment. Part 2 surveys Supreme Court precedents on the topic. Part 3 discusses state statutory schemes for involuntary mental hospitalization, while Part 4 describes the current state of sexual violent predator statutes. Part 5 delves into professional psychiatric literature about the ambiguity of psychiatric diagnoses. Part 6 synthesizes the article’s findings to identify the appropriate burden of proof required to prevent the wrongful infringement on patients’ due process rights.
Keywords: Mental illness, constitutional law, Necessary and Proper Clause, United States v. Comstock, civil commitment hearings, due process, involuntary mental hospitalization, patients' rights
JEL Classification: I18, K10, K30, K32, K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation