Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints in OECD Countries

27 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2010

See all articles by Thomas Stratmann

Thomas Stratmann

George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy; George Mason University - Mercatus Center; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Ernesto Crivelli

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Adam Leive

University of Virginia - Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

Date Written: June 2010

Abstract

Government spending on health has grown as a percent of GDP over the last 40 years in industrialized countries. Widespread decentralization of healthcare systems has often accompanied this increase in spending. In this paper, we explore the effect of soft budget constraints on subnational health spending in a sample of OECD countries. We find countries where subnational governments rely primarily on central government financing and enjoy large borrowing autonomy have higher healthcare spending than those with more restrictions on subnational government borrowing.

Suggested Citation

Stratmann, Thomas and Crivelli, Ernesto and Leive, Adam, Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints in OECD Countries (June 2010). IMF Working Paper No. 10/147, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1632146

Thomas Stratmann (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2330 (Phone)

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mercatus.org/scholars/thomas-stratmann

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Ernesto Crivelli

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Adam Leive

University of Virginia - Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy ( email )

235 McCormick Rd.
P.O. Box 400893
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4893
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
131
Abstract Views
1,066
Rank
390,836
PlumX Metrics