A Comparison of the Appraisal Process for Auction and Private Treaty Residential Sales

11 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2010

See all articles by Simon Stevenson

Simon Stevenson

City University London - The Business School

James Young

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Constantin Gurdgiev

Monfort College of Business, University of Northern Colorado; Trinity Business School, Trinity College, Dublin

Date Written: July 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper examines residential sale mechanisms from an appraisal perspective and empirically tests for differences in the valuation process for auctioned and private treaty sales. We test the hypothesis that agents use different criteria in preparing the guide prices for auctioned housing, with an element of under pricing in order to aid in the marketing of the property. The empirical tests are undertaken on a sample of auctioned and private treaty sales in Dublin, Ireland for the period of 1997–2004. We find that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that agents do adjust valuations for auctions to attract additional potential bidders.

Keywords: Real estate auctions, Auction price premium

JEL Classification: D44, L85

Suggested Citation

Stevenson, Simon and Young, James and Gurdgiev, Constantin, A Comparison of the Appraisal Process for Auction and Private Treaty Residential Sales (July 1, 2010). Journal of Housing Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1633516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1633516

Simon Stevenson (Contact Author)

City University London - The Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

James Young

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Constantin Gurdgiev

Monfort College of Business, University of Northern Colorado ( email )

Kepner Hall
800 17th Street
Greeley, CO 80639
United States
80639 (Fax)

Trinity Business School, Trinity College, Dublin ( email )

Aras an Phiarsaigh
College Green
Dublin, Leinster D2
Ireland

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