How Does the Government Interact with Business?: From History to Controversies

Ohio State University Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal, Vol. 5, p. 707, 2010

Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2012-19

27 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2010 Last revised: 26 Sep 2012

See all articles by Reza Dibadj

Reza Dibadj

University of San Francisco - School of Law

Date Written: July 22, 2010

Abstract

The relationship between American government and American business is a vast topic of immeasurable complexity. In keeping with the timely and important theme of this Symposium, yet at the same try to focus its line of inquiry, this Article first offers a brief survey of the relationship between government and business viewed through a regulatory lens. Using this history as backdrop, it then uses three illustrative doctrinal areas as symptomatic of how this relationship has become problematic and how it might be improved.

The piece is structured into two principal sections. Part I provides a historical overview of the history of regulation in America, as well as two new paradigms that have emerged in regulatory theory: the regulation of bottleneck inputs, and cooperative federalism. Part II, the core of the Article, focuses on three controversial areas where the relationship between government and business has become problematic and is ripe for reform: corporate and securities law, antitrust, and constitutional law. In each area, I point to problems in current legal arrangements, and suggest a path to reform.

Keywords: government-business relations, regulation

Suggested Citation

Dibadj, Reza, How Does the Government Interact with Business?: From History to Controversies (July 22, 2010). Ohio State University Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal, Vol. 5, p. 707, 2010, Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2012-19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1647419

Reza Dibadj (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco - School of Law ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States
415-422-5253 (Phone)

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