On the Separability of Assembly Preferences

Posted: 14 Jul 1999

See all articles by Jean-Pierre Benoit

Jean-Pierre Benoit

London Business School - Department of Economics

Lewis A. Kornhauser

New York University School of Law

Abstract

Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. This candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over assemblies are separable. We show, however, that if preferences over assemblies are themselves derived from underlying preferences over legislative or economic outcomes, then preferences over assemblies will not in general be separable.

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Benoit, Jean-Pierre and Kornhauser, Lewis A., On the Separability of Assembly Preferences. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=164825

Jean-Pierre Benoit

London Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Lewis A. Kornhauser (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
(212) 998-6175 (Phone)
(212) 995-4341 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
680
PlumX Metrics