On the Separability of Assembly Preferences
Posted: 14 Jul 1999
Abstract
Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. This candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over assemblies are separable. We show, however, that if preferences over assemblies are themselves derived from underlying preferences over legislative or economic outcomes, then preferences over assemblies will not in general be separable.
JEL Classification: D71, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Benoit, Jean-Pierre and Kornhauser, Lewis A., On the Separability of Assembly Preferences. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=164825
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