The Informal Sector: An Equilibrium Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Brazil, Second Version

30 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2010

See all articles by Aureo de Paula

Aureo de Paula

University College London - Department of Economics

José A. Scheinkman

Columbia University; Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 26, 2010

Abstract

We test implications of a simple equilibrium model of informality using a survey of 48,000 small firms in Brazil. In the model, agent's ability to manage production differ and informal firms face a higher cost of capital and limitation on size, although these informal firms avoid tax payments. As a result, informal firms are managed by less able entrepreneurs, are smaller, and employ a lower capital-labor ratio. The model predicts that the interaction of an index of observable inputs to entrepreneurial ability and formality is positively correlated with firm size, which we verify in the data. Using the model, we estimate that informal firms in our data-set faced at least 1.3 times the cost of capital of formal firms.

Keywords: Informal Sector, Tax Avoidance, Brazil

JEL Classification: H2, H3, K4

Suggested Citation

de Paula, Aureo and Scheinkman, José, The Informal Sector: An Equilibrium Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Brazil, Second Version (July 26, 2010). PIER Working Paper No. 10-024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1648988 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1648988

Aureo De Paula (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

José Scheinkman

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Princeton, NJ 08544
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HOME PAGE: http://www.princeton.edu/~joses

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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United States

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