Difference and Deference, Models of Democratic Deliberation

Posted: 2 Sep 2010

Date Written: July 1, 2010

Abstract

In this draft I outline a model of structured deliberation in a heterogeneous social network and study the effects of heterogeneity and network structure on the accuracy of majority voting in the network. I show that diversity increases the accuracy of the majority rule when the voters deliberate beforehand. Without deliberation, diversity can result in inaccurate majority decisions.

Keywords: Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT), Crowd behavior, Deference, Deliberative democracy, Followers, Opinion leaders

Suggested Citation

Mehrdad, Navid, Difference and Deference, Models of Democratic Deliberation (July 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1669830 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1669830

Navid Mehrdad (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

New York, NY NY 10027
United States

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