Corporate Venture Capital and the Returns to Acquiring Portfolio Companies

47 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2010

See all articles by David F. Benson

David F. Benson

Utah Valley University; Brigham Young University

Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

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Date Written: October 9, 2009

Abstract

A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.

Keywords: corporate venture capital, acquisitions, entrepreneurial finance, owner’s curse, governance, overconfidence

JEL Classification: G34, D82

Suggested Citation

Benson, David F. and Ziedonis, Rosemarie Ham, Corporate Venture Capital and the Returns to Acquiring Portfolio Companies (October 9, 2009). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1681165 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1681165

David F. Benson (Contact Author)

Utah Valley University ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.davidfbenson.com

Brigham Young University ( email )

Provo, UT 84602
United States
801-422-8383 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://marriottschool.byu.edu/employee/employee.cfm?emp=dfb6

Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

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