Round-Robin Tournaments with Effort Constraints

22 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2010

See all articles by Eyal Erez

Eyal Erez

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: September 2010

Abstract

We study a round-robin tournament with n symmetric players where in each of the n-1 stages each of the players competes against a different player in the Tullock contest. Each player has a limited budget of effort that decreases within the stages proportionally to the effort he exerted in the previous stages. We show that when the prize for winning (value of winning) is equal between the stages, a player's effort is weakly decreasing over the stages. We also show how the contest designer can influence the players' allocation of effort by changing the distribution of prizes between the stages. In particular, we analyze the optimal distribution of prizes over the stages that balance the effort allocation such that a player exerts the same effort over the different stages. In addition, we analyze the distribution of prizes over the stages that maximizes the players' expected total effort.

Keywords: effort Constraints, Round-Robin Tournaments, Tullock Contests

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Erez, Eyal and Sela, Aner, Round-Robin Tournaments with Effort Constraints (September 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1707911

Eyal Erez (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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