The Effects of National Institutions and Collective Bargaining Arrangements on Job Quality in Front-Line Service Workplaces

Posted: 21 Dec 2010

See all articles by Virginia Doellgast

Virginia Doellgast

University of London, King's College London, Department of Management

Ursula Holtgrewe

FORBA

Stephen Deery

University of London - King's College - Department of Management

Date Written: July 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationships among national institutions, collective bargaining arrangements, and job quality in call center workplaces, using establishment-level survey data obtained in 2003-2006 in five European coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden) and three liberal market economies (LMEs) (Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom). Overall, the authors find lower dismissal rates, more use of high-involvement management practices, and less performance monitoring in the CMEs, consistent with the notion that national institutions can influence employment practices even in more poorly regulated service workplaces. However, workplace-level collective bargaining arrangements and in-house (compared to outsourced) status also were associated with significantly higher measures of job quality across countries. Findings suggest that within CMEs, dual union/works council representation continues to provide important support for job security, participation, and discretion, but that outsourcing can effect a partial escape from this institution.

Keywords: globalization of services, strategic HRM, outsourcing, call centers, collective representation

JEL Classification: J2, J50

Suggested Citation

Doellgast, Virginia and Holtgrewe, Ursula and Deery, Stephen, The Effects of National Institutions and Collective Bargaining Arrangements on Job Quality in Front-Line Service Workplaces (July 1, 2009). Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1728952

Virginia Doellgast (Contact Author)

University of London, King's College London, Department of Management ( email )

150 Stamford Street
London, SE1 9NN
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7848 4374 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/mgmt/staff/virginiadoellgast.html

Ursula Holtgrewe

FORBA ( email )

Aspernbruckengasse 4 / 5
A-1020 Wien
Austria

Stephen Deery

University of London - King's College - Department of Management ( email )

150 Stamford Street
London, SE1 9NN
United Kingdom
0207-848-4181 (Phone)
0207-848-4181 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/pse/mancen/staff/stephen_deery.htm

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