Responding to Political Corruption: Some Institutional Considerations

23 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2011

See all articles by Jonathan L. Entin

Jonathan L. Entin

Case Western Reserve University School of Law

Date Written: January 1, 2011

Abstract

This article, written for a conference on "The Scandal of Political Corruption and the Law’s Response," examines some institutional mechanisms (such as open-meetings laws and term limits) that are intended to prevent corruption and others (such as independent counsels, special prosecutors, and ethics commissions) that seek to punish corruption after the fact. The article assesses some of the legal and practical constraints of these devices and, relying on the insights of Durkheim and other social scientists, asks whether some minimum level of corruption might serve the function of helping to define and reinforce social norms and values.

Keywords: Corruption, Political corruption, Open meeting laws, Constitutional law, First Amendment, Term limits, Prosecution of corrupt officials, Independent Counsel, State ethics commissions, Durkheim

JEL Classification: K10, K42

Suggested Citation

Entin, Jonathan L., Responding to Political Corruption: Some Institutional Considerations (January 1, 2011). Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 42, 2011, Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1734414

Jonathan L. Entin (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University School of Law ( email )

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