The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation
Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2011-03-002
Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2011-2
48 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2011 Last revised: 29 Aug 2022
Date Written: March 2011
Abstract
We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observes lender renegotiation actions and covers more than 60% of US mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in this data, we find that bank-held loans are 26% to 36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2 to 5.7% in absolute terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have lower post-modification default rate by 9% (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans.
Keywords: Financial Crisis, Loss Mitigation, Mortgage Crisis, Securitization, Lenders, Servicers, Liquidation, Modification, Repayment, Refinance, Default, Delinquency, Borrower, Interest Rates, Household Finance, Credit, Housing, FICO Score, Leverage, LTV, Loan Modiccation, Mortgage, GSE, HAMP, Loan Term
JEL Classification: D1, D8, G1, G2
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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