Discretion Within Constraint: Homophily and Structure in a Formal Organization

Forthcoming in Organization Science

39 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2011 Last revised: 10 Oct 2012

See all articles by Adam M. Kleinbaum

Adam M. Kleinbaum

Tuck School of Business; Dartmouth College

Toby Stuart

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Michael Tushman

Harvard University - Organizational Behavior Unit

Date Written: October 4, 2012

Abstract

Homophily in social relations results from both individual preferences and selective opportunities for interaction, but how these two mechanisms interact in large, contemporary organizations is not well understood. We argue that organizational structures and geography delimit opportunities for interaction such that actors have a greater level of discretion to choose their interaction partners within business units, job functions, offices and quasi-formal structures. This leads us to expect to find a higher proportion of homophilous interactions within these organizational structures than across their boundaries. We test our theory in an analysis of the rate of dyadic communication in an e-mail data set comprising thousands of employees in a large information technology firm. These findings have implications for research on homophily, gender relations in organizations, and formal and informal organizational structure.

Keywords: Social Networks, Homophily, Gender, Formal Structure, Organizational Structure

Suggested Citation

Kleinbaum, Adam M. and Stuart, Toby E. and Stuart, Toby E. and Tushman, Michael, Discretion Within Constraint: Homophily and Structure in a Formal Organization (October 4, 2012). Forthcoming in Organization Science, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1749512 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1749512

Adam M. Kleinbaum (Contact Author)

Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH
United States

HOME PAGE: http://bit.ly/kleinbaum

Dartmouth College ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

Toby E. Stuart

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02163
United States

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Michael Tushman

Harvard University - Organizational Behavior Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

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