Targeted Transfers and the Fiscal Response to the Great Recession

43 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2011

See all articles by Hyunseung Oh

Hyunseung Oh

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Ricardo Reis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2011

Abstract

Between 2007 and 2009, government expenditures increased rapidly across the OECD countries. While economic research on the impact of government purchases has flourished, in the data, about three quarters of the increase in expenditures in the United States (and more in other countries) was in government transfers. We document this fact, and show that the increase in U.S. spending on retirement, disability, and medical care has been as high as the increase in government purchases. We argue that future research should focus on the positive impact of transfers. Towards this, we present a model in which there is no representative agent and Ricardian equivalence does not hold because of uncertainty, imperfect credit markets, and nominal rigidities. Targeted lump-sum transfers are expansionary both because of a neoclassical wealth effect and because of a Keynesian aggregate demand effect.

Keywords: Fiscal policy, Incomplete markets, Nominal rigidities

JEL Classification: E62, H31, H50

Suggested Citation

Oh, Hyunseung and Reis, Ricardo A.M.R., Targeted Transfers and the Fiscal Response to the Great Recession (February 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8239, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1758449

Hyunseung Oh (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Ricardo A.M.R. Reis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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