Sequential Auctions and Auction Design

32 Pages Posted: 5 May 2011

See all articles by David J. Salant

David J. Salant

Toulouse School of Economics; Columbia University - Columbia Institute for Tele Information

Date Written: December 10, 2010

Abstract

Often an auction designer has the option of selling, or purchasing, those lots available in one auction or a sequence of auctions. In addition, bidder opportunities will not be static, in part due to arrival of information, but also because bidders can face deadlines for making decisions. This paper examines the optimal decision about how to divide what is available over time.

Keywords: sequential auction

Suggested Citation

Salant, David J., Sequential Auctions and Auction Design (December 10, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792621 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1792621

David J. Salant (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.tse-fr.eu

Columbia University - Columbia Institute for Tele Information ( email )

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