Sour Chocolate: The U.K. Takeover Panel's Improper Reaction to Kraft's Acquisition of Cadbury

8 BYU International Law & Management Review 64 (2011)

24 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2011 Last revised: 7 May 2012

Date Written: April 1, 2011

Abstract

This article critiques the U.K. Takeover Panel Code Committee’s proposals to amend the U.K. Takeover Code in response to Kraft’s acquisition of Cadbury, on the premise that well-founded takeover law and regulation should focus on fair process and leave socioeconomic factors and foreign investment regulation to other areas of the law. After outlining the United Kingdom’s takeover regime and the Takeover Panel’s review of the Takeover Code, this article offers a critique of two specific proposed reforms contained in the Takeover Panel Report. This article then questions the effectiveness of the regime under the Takeover Panel Report’s proposals and introduces an alternative approach to fulfilling the Takeover Panel’s goals that the Panel missed. This article concludes by calling for additional research to determine the proper course and proposals the Panel should take.

Keywords: M&A, mergers and acquisitions, corporations, business, United Kingdom, takeover, Cadbury, Kraft, shareholders, governance, regulation

Suggested Citation

Patrone, Michael R., Sour Chocolate: The U.K. Takeover Panel's Improper Reaction to Kraft's Acquisition of Cadbury (April 1, 2011). 8 BYU International Law & Management Review 64 (2011), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1800468

Michael R. Patrone (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States

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