Individual Rights and Transnational Networks

COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, pp. 632-638, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, eds., 2010

GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 560

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 560

8 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2011 Last revised: 17 Oct 2011

See all articles by Francesca Bignami

Francesca Bignami

George Washington University - Law School

Date Written: September 30, 2010

Abstract

Transnational regulatory networks have become increasingly powerful over the past decades. For public law scholars, one of the most pressing questions raised by transnational networks is whether they respect the constitutional and administrative principles that have been developed within the context of the nation state. Although the focus of recent scholarship has been the democratic accountability of networks tasked with agenda-setting and rule-making powers, certain networks are also responsible for individualized decision-making and carry the risk of undermining liberal rights. Examples include the UN Sanctions Committee, Europol, and the administration of EU customs and agricultural policy. This contribution identifies some of the challenges of protecting rights in the radically fragmented universe of network governance and offers reflections on how these challenges might be met based on the longstanding experience of the European Court of Justice.

Keywords: regulatory networks

JEL Classification: K23, K33

Suggested Citation

Bignami, Francesca, Individual Rights and Transnational Networks (September 30, 2010). COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, pp. 632-638, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, eds., 2010, GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 560, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 560, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1818363

Francesca Bignami (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-2470 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=14593

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