Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 752

48 Pages Posted: 30 May 2011 Last revised: 10 Sep 2014

See all articles by Maria Bigoni

Maria Bigoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Margherita Fort

University of Bologna; Ifo Institute, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute), Ifo Institute; IZA

Mattia Nardotto

KU Leuven

Tommaso Reggiani

Masaryk University

Date Written: May 23, 2011

Abstract

This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.

Keywords: education, field experiments, incentives, competition, cooperation

JEL Classification: A22, C93, I20

Suggested Citation

Bigoni, Maria and Fort, Margherita and Nardotto, Mattia and Reggiani, Tommaso, Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement (May 23, 2011). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 752, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1854133 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1854133

Maria Bigoni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
Italy
+390512098134 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/maria.bigoni/en

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Margherita Fort

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40100
Italy

Ifo Institute, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute), Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich
Germany

IZA ( email )

Mattia Nardotto

KU Leuven ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mattianardotto/Home

Tommaso Reggiani

Masaryk University ( email )

Zerotinovo nam. 9
60177 Brno, 603 00
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.muni.cz/en/people/241092-tommaso-reggiani

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