Executive Stock Options and Investment Choice

La Trobe University, School of Business Working Paper No. A99.11

32 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2000

See all articles by Chongwoo Choe

Chongwoo Choe

Monash University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 22, 1999

Abstract

Using a simple three-period model in which a manager can gather information before making an investment decision, this paper studies incentive effects of various executive stock options. In particular, we show how the exercise price of executive stock options is related to base salary, the size of option grant, leverage, and the riskiness of desired investment policy. The optimal exercise price increases in the size of grant and base salary, and decreases in leverage and the riskiness of desired investment policy. Other things equal, the optimal exercise price of European options with longer maturity should increase more for an increase in base salary and the size of grant, and decrease more for an increase in leverage than the one with shorter maturity. The optimal exercise price of American options is determined completely by the optimal exercise prices of European options with two different maturities. Given the fixed exercise price, the size of option grant does not decrease in the face value of debt.

JEL Classification: D82, G32, J33

Suggested Citation

Choe, Chongwoo, Executive Stock Options and Investment Choice (September 22, 1999). La Trobe University, School of Business Working Paper No. A99.11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=185499 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.185499

Chongwoo Choe (Contact Author)

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
PO Box 197
Caulfield East, Victoria 3145
Australia
+61 2 9903 1125 (Phone)
+61 2 9903 1128 (Fax)

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