Competition and Commercial Media Bias

Telecommunications Policy, vol. 36 (5), pp. 434-447, 2012.

Posted: 4 Jul 2011 Last revised: 5 Nov 2013

See all articles by Andrea Blasco

Andrea Blasco

Joint Research Center of the European Commission; Harvard University - Institute for Quantitative Social Science

Francesco Sobbrio

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: November 2011

Abstract

This paper reviews the empirical evidence on commercial media bias (i.e., advertisers influence over media accuracy) and then introduces a simple model to summarize the main elements of the theoretical literature. The analysis provides three main policy insights for media regulators: i) Media regulators should target their monitoring efforts towards news contents upon which advertisers are likely to share similar preferences; ii) In advertising industries characterized by high correlation in products' qualities, an increase in the degree of competition may translate into a lower accuracy of news reports; iii) A sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news drives out commercial media bias.

Keywords: Advertising, Media accuracy, Two-sided market, Competition, Commercial Media Bias

JEL Classification: L13, L15, L82, D82

Suggested Citation

Blasco, Andrea and Sobbrio, Francesco, Competition and Commercial Media Bias (November 2011). Telecommunications Policy, vol. 36 (5), pp. 434-447, 2012. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1878413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1878413

Andrea Blasco (Contact Author)

Joint Research Center of the European Commission ( email )

Rue Des Champs Du Mars
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Harvard University - Institute for Quantitative Social Science ( email )

1737 Cambridge St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Francesco Sobbrio

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via columbia 2
Rome, Rome 00123
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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