Bootleggers, Baptists, and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in the Rational Game and Morality Play of Regulatory Politics

The Independent Review, Winter 2011

Posted: 5 Jul 2011

See all articles by Randy T. Simmons

Randy T. Simmons

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Diana Weinert Thomas

Creighton University

Ryan Yonk

Utah State University - Department of Political Science; American Institute for Economic Research

Date Written: July 4, 2011

Abstract

Politics makes strange bedfellows, including alliances of profiteers and moralists who lobby for the same regulations, but for vastly different reasons. Whether such coalitions promote alcohol prohibition (as did the bootleggers and Baptists to whom similar “unholy alliances” are likened), tobacco restrictions, NAFTA, or climate-change policies, political entrepreneurs are the glue that holds them together.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Collective Action, Institutions

JEL Classification: L26, D72, D02

Suggested Citation

Simmons, Randy T. and Thomas, Diana Weinert and Yonk, Ryan and Yonk, Ryan, Bootleggers, Baptists, and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in the Rational Game and Morality Play of Regulatory Politics (July 4, 2011). The Independent Review, Winter 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1878644

Randy T. Simmons

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Diana Weinert Thomas (Contact Author)

Creighton University ( email )

2500 California Plaza
Omaha, NE 68178
United States

Ryan Yonk

Utah State University - Department of Political Science ( email )

0725 University Blvd.
Logan, UT 84322-0725
United States

American Institute for Economic Research ( email )

PO Box 1000
Great Barrington, MA 01230
United States

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