Individual Vessel Quotas in Peru: Stopping the Race for Anchovies

Marine Resource Economics, Forthcoming

13 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2011

See all articles by Sigbjorn Tveteras

Sigbjorn Tveteras

CENTRUM Catolica, Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru

Carlos E. Paredes

University of San Martín de Porres

Julio Peña-Torres

Universidad Alberto Hurtado - Departamento de Economia y Administracion

Date Written: July 5, 2011

Abstract

In January 2009 a new management regime of individual vessel quotas (IVQs) was put in force in the world’s largest fishery, the Peruvian anchovy fishery. Until 2009, the fishery was managed by a regulated open access system with clear symptoms of the race for fish. We argue that the new regime has stopped the race for fish, reduced the number of vessels participating in the fishery, and prolonged the fishing season. Furthermore, the IVQs appear to have improved profitability in the fishery and increased value-added production in the Peruvian anchovy value chains. This provides support that developing countries with presumed weaker institutions can reap benefits of such management systems. However, there appears to have been setbacks in 2010, as the number of participating vessels has once again increased. This indicates that the institutions that regulate and monitor the fishery must be further strengthened.

Keywords: fishery management, individual vessel quotas, Peruvian anchovy

JEL Classification: Q22, Q27

Suggested Citation

Tveteras, Sigbjorn and Paredes, Carlos E. and Peña-Torres, Julio, Individual Vessel Quotas in Peru: Stopping the Race for Anchovies (July 5, 2011). Marine Resource Economics, Forthcoming , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1879490

Sigbjorn Tveteras (Contact Author)

CENTRUM Catolica, Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru ( email )

Alomia Robles 125
Lima, Lima 33
Peru

Carlos E. Paredes

University of San Martín de Porres ( email )

Av. Las Calandrias s/n
Santa Anita
Lima, Lima
Peru

Julio Peña-Torres

Universidad Alberto Hurtado - Departamento de Economia y Administracion ( email )

Erasmo Escala 1835
Santiago, 6500620
Chile

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