Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs
16 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2011
Date Written: June 29, 2011
Abstract
An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability. Nonetheless, we show that every strictly rationalizable action is robustly rationalizable. We also investigate how permissive robust rationalizability becomes if we require that players be fully certain of their own payoffs.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Morris, Stephen Edward and Takahashi, Satoru and Tercieux, Olivier, Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs (June 29, 2011). Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 017-2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1881151 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1881151
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