Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies

111 Mich. L. Rev. __ (2013)

Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 241

45 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2011 Last revised: 6 Mar 2013

See all articles by James J. Park

James J. Park

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: March 5, 2013

Abstract

This is the first extensive empirical study of securities class actions involving bankrupt companies. It examines 1466 securities class actions filed from 1996 to 2004, of which 234 (16%) involved companies that were in bankruptcy proceedings while the securities class action was pending. The study tests the hypothesis that securities class actions involving bankrupt companies (“bankruptcy cases”) are more likely to have merit than securities class actions involving companies that are not in bankruptcy (“non-bankruptcy cases”). It finds that bankruptcy cases were more likely to involve restatements than non-bankruptcy cases, but not more likely to have other indicia of merit. Bankruptcy cases were more likely to be successful in terms of dismissal rates, significant settlements, and third party settlements than non-bankruptcy cases. This bankruptcy effect fades with respect to settlements of $20 million or more, likely reflecting the influence of D&O insurance policy limits. The bankruptcy effect is evidence that courts and parties assess the merits of securities class actions differently based on the context of the suit.

Keywords: Securities, 10b-5, securities fraud, securities regulation, bankruptcy, securities and bankruptcy, securities class actions, class actions, securities class actions and bankruptcy

Suggested Citation

Park, James J., Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies (March 5, 2013). 111 Mich. L. Rev. __ (2013), Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 241, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1892229 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1892229

James J. Park (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

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