Market Failure and Natural Disasters: A Reexamination of Anti-Gouging Laws
Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2008
Posted: 23 Jul 2011
Date Written: 2008
Abstract
This article first reviews Professor Rapp’s conclusion that economic arguments offer a decidedly negative view of anti-gouging laws. It then analyzes and critiques Professor Rapp’s economic defense of such regulations by (1) applying a standard economic concept - elasticity - and highlighting the role of the market as a discovery process and (2) addressing behavioral economics’ assumptions about individuals’ responsiveness to price changes. Finally, this article offers recommendations concerning such laws.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Skarbek, David, Market Failure and Natural Disasters: A Reexamination of Anti-Gouging Laws (2008). Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1893547
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