Controlling Trust and Trusting Controls

27 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2011

See all articles by Narisa Tianjing Dai

Narisa Tianjing Dai

University of International Business and Economics - Business School

Guliang Tang

University of International Business and Economics

Xuan Xiao

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: August 14, 2011

Abstract

This paper seeks to explore the nature of, and relationships among, multi-levels of trust within international joint ventures (IJVs) as well as the mechanisms through which trust interacts through different control mechanisms in a longitudinal multi-case approach. Empirical evidence collected from five car-manufacturing IJVs in China shows that organizational trust between two partners of an IJV are reinforced with personal trust among managers and employees. It is also found that personal trust between senior managers can have a negative impact on the organizational trust of Boards of Directors (BOD) in senior managers assigned to IJVs. This paper complements the literature in IJV management by showing that at a mature stage, social controls are more effective and strengthen trust at different levels while formal controls can lead to increased levels of conflict and frictions between partners.

Suggested Citation

Dai, Narisa Tianjing and Tang, Guliang and Xiao, Xuan, Controlling Trust and Trusting Controls (August 14, 2011). AAA 2012 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1909433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1909433

Narisa Tianjing Dai (Contact Author)

University of International Business and Economics - Business School ( email )

10, Huixin Dongjie
Changyang District
Beijing, Beijing 100029
China
0086-1064493525 (Phone)

Guliang Tang

University of International Business and Economics ( email )

No. 10, Huixin Dongjie, Chaoyang District
Beijing, 100029
China

Xuan Xiao

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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