The implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence on individual performance

Posted: 15 Aug 2011 Last revised: 19 Jan 2018

See all articles by Karen Sedatole

Karen Sedatole

Goizueta Business School

Amy Swaney

Central Michigan University

Alex Woods

College of William and Mary

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the provision of team rewards unnecessary to ensure individual and team productivity. We conclude that horizontal monitoring and team member dependence are complementary control mechanisms whose effectiveness helps explain the observed practice of organizing work into teams without explicit team-based rewards.

Keywords: Horizontal monitoring, task interdependence, teams, individual performance

JEL Classification: M10, M4, M52

Suggested Citation

Sedatole, Karen and Swaney, Amy and Woods, Alex, The implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence on individual performance (2015). Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1909796 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1909796

Karen Sedatole (Contact Author)

Goizueta Business School ( email )

1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322-2722
United States

Amy Swaney

Central Michigan University ( email )

Mt. Pleasant, MI 48858
United States

Alex Woods

College of William and Mary ( email )

P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23185
United States

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