The implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence on individual performance
Posted: 15 Aug 2011 Last revised: 19 Jan 2018
Date Written: 2015
Abstract
This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the provision of team rewards unnecessary to ensure individual and team productivity. We conclude that horizontal monitoring and team member dependence are complementary control mechanisms whose effectiveness helps explain the observed practice of organizing work into teams without explicit team-based rewards.
Keywords: Horizontal monitoring, task interdependence, teams, individual performance
JEL Classification: M10, M4, M52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates
-
Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates
-
The Company You Keep: The Effects of Family and Neighborhood on Disadvantaged Youths
By Anne Case and Lawrence F. Katz
-
Network Effects and Welfare Cultures
By Marianne Bertrand, Erzo F. P. Luttmer, ...
-
The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto
By David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser, ...