Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance

Armour, John; Deakin, Simon; Konzelmann, Suzanne J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1930885

Download This Paper

Open PDF in Browser

Add Paper to My Library

Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance

Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 266

31 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2011

See all articles by John Armour

John Armour

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Simon Deakin

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Suzanne J. Konzelmann

University of London - Birkbeck College - Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology; University of Cambridge - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

Date Written: June 1, 2003

Abstract

Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks to European Community influence. Moreover, institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favor stakeholder-inclusive practices. We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.

Keywords: corporate governance, stakeholding, hostile takeovers, company law, insolvency, employee representation, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: D23, G32, G33, G34, K22, K31

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Deakin, Simon F. and Konzelmann, Suzanne J., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance (June 1, 2003). Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 266, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930885 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930885