Golden Rules for Wages

37 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2011 Last revised: 29 Jul 2013

See all articles by Andrew T. Young

Andrew T. Young

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business

Hernando Zuleta

Universidad del Rosario

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2013

Abstract

We consider a decentralized version of the neoclassical growth model where labor share is chosen by workers to maximize their long run (permanent) wages. In this framework, if the labor share increases relative to the competitive share, workers capture a larger share of a smaller total income in the steady-state. This is because the incentives to invest are lower and the steady-state capital to labor ratio is lower. We find that the “Golden Rule” labor share is equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labor. This is precisely what would obtain under the assumption of competitive factor markets. We also consider the model with two classes of workers: organized and unorganized. In this case, organized labor may choose a higher than competitive share and the difference is economically significant for plausible parameter values. Furthermore, relative to the Cobb-Douglas case, organized labor chooses a higher share for the empirically relevant case of an elasticity of substitution less than unity. We also analyze a multisector version of the model where workers in each sector are organized and choose their share of that sector’s output. The golden rule of wages still holds: each sector’s workers can do no better than to choose the competitive labor share. In summary: organized labor can only improve its lot at the expense of unorganized labor; not at the expense of capital.

Keywords: labor share, capital share, factor shares, trade unions, bargaining power, organized labor, political economy

JEL Classification: O43, J30

Suggested Citation

Young, Andrew T. and Zuleta, Hernando, Golden Rules for Wages (May 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1942318 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1942318

Andrew T. Young (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

Hernando Zuleta

Universidad del Rosario ( email )

Calle 12 No. 6-25
Bogota, DC
Colombia

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