Service Deregulation, Competition and the Performance of French and Italian Firms

38 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2011

See all articles by Francesco Daveri

Francesco Daveri

University of Parma - Dipartimento di Economia; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

Remy Lecat

Banque de France

Maria Laura Parisi

University of Brescia, Department of Economics and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2011

Abstract

We use firm-level data for France and Italy to explore the impact of service regulation reform implemented in the two countries on the mark-up and eventually on the performance of firms between the second half of the 1990s and 2007. In line with some previous studies, we find that the relation between entry barriers and productivity is negative. This relation is intermediated through the firm’s mark up and is stronger in the long than in the short run.

Keywords: regulation, services, performance, TFP

JEL Classification: D24, K20, L51, O40, O57

Suggested Citation

Daveri, Francesco and Lecat, Remy and Parisi, Maria Laura, Service Deregulation, Competition and the Performance of French and Italian Firms (October 1, 2011). Banque de France Working Paper No. 346, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1950551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1950551

Francesco Daveri

University of Parma - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Via Kennedy 6
Parma, Parma 43100
Italy
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HOME PAGE: http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/daveri/

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 3325 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 3302 (Fax)

Remy Lecat (Contact Author)

Banque de France ( email )

Paris
France

Maria Laura Parisi

University of Brescia, Department of Economics and Management ( email )

via San Faustino 74/b
Brescia, 25122
Italy
+39 0302988826 (Phone)
+39 0302988837 (Fax)

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