Strategic Manipulability Without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized

Posted: 27 Jan 2000

See all articles by John Duggan

John Duggan

University of Rochester - Department of Economics; University of Rochester - Department of Political Science

Thomas Schwartz

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science

Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.

JEL Classification: D70

Suggested Citation

Duggan, John and Duggan, John and Schwartz, Thomas, Strategic Manipulability Without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=195528

John Duggan (Contact Author)

University of Rochester - Department of Economics ( email )

Harkness Hall
Rochester, NY 14627-0158
United States
585-273-4999 (Phone)

University of Rochester - Department of Political Science ( email )

Rochester, NY 14627
United States

Thomas Schwartz

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science

405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
United States
310-825-1972 (Phone)

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