Strategic Manipulability Without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized
Posted: 27 Jan 2000
Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.
JEL Classification: D70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Duggan, John and Duggan, John and Schwartz, Thomas, Strategic Manipulability Without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=195528
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.