Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

48 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2011

See all articles by Bernhard Ganglmair

Bernhard Ganglmair

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Junior Research Group Competition and Innovation; Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI); University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Emanuele Tarantino

Luiss Guido Carli University; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.

Keywords: patent holdup, patent disclosure, standard setting organizations, industry standards, disclosure rules, conversation, asymmetric information, Bertrand competition

JEL Classification: D71, L15, O34

Suggested Citation

Ganglmair, Bernhard and Tarantino, Emanuele, Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting (October 2011). NET Institute Working Paper No. 11-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1957991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957991

Bernhard Ganglmair (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Junior Research Group Competition and Innovation ( email )

L7,1
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI) ( email )

L 7, 1
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Emanuele Tarantino

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

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