Download This PaperUsing 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competition
Melbourne Business School Working Paper No. 99-12
13 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 1999
Date Written: November 26, 1999
Abstract
This paper demonstrates that low (below marginal cost) interconnect or access charges can be used to sustain high subscription prices in an environment of network competition with two-part tariffs and price discrimination. This result stands in contrast to other results in the literature suggesting that high interconnect charges can play a collusive role.
JEL Classification: L41, L96
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gans, Joshua S. and King, Stephen Peter, Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competition (November 26, 1999). Melbourne Business School Working Paper No. 99-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=196772 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.196772
Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com
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