Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long?

KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich Working Paper No. 295

19 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2012

See all articles by Christoph Moser

Christoph Moser

ETH Zürich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute

Andrew Kenan Rose

University of California - Haas School of Business; NUS Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 17, 2012

Abstract

The Doha multilateral round of trade negotiations sponsored by the WTO has been dragging on for over a decade, with no end in sight. In this short paper we assess empirically what determines the duration of trade negotiations, focusing on the span between the start of trade talks and their conclusion. We use data from 88 regional trade agreements between 1988 and 2009, and a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model. Four factors are robust determinants of the length of RTA negotiations. Negotiations are more protracted when there are more countries at the negotiation table, and when the countries are not from the same region. Negotiations between more open and richer countries are also finished more quickly.

Keywords: regional, GATT, WTO, duration, income, data, empirical, Cox, survival

JEL Classification: F13, F51, F53

Suggested Citation

Moser, Christoph and Rose, Andrew Kenan and Rose, Andrew Kenan, Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long? (January 17, 2012). KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich Working Paper No. 295, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1986788 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986788

Christoph Moser (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute ( email )

Zurich
Switzerland

Andrew Kenan Rose

University of California - Haas School of Business ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-6609 (Phone)
510-642-4700 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose

NUS Business School ( email )

15 Kent Ridge Dr
Singapore, 119245
Singapore

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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