Dividends and Strength of Japanese Business Group Affiliation

Abstract

While the study of dividend policy in Japan has investigated the role of group affiliation, it has heretofore neglected the impact of the strength of group affiliation. Using the strength of group association, a new variable in the study of dividend policy, we document that the probability of dividend payment by firms in Japanese business groups declines as the affiliation to the business group strengthens – a finding consistent with transferring cash from weakly associated firms to those strongly associated with the business group. Further, the contractual claimant position of main banks seems important as the ratio of short-term debt to long-term debt is negatively related to dividend payment in Japanese firms. Finally, we also reconfirm that dividends in Japan are positively related to firm size, profitability, and investment opportunities, and negatively to firm risk. These findings should be of much interest to managers, scholars, and policy-makers.

Keywords: Dividend policy, Japan, Corporate Governance, Business Groups, Tunneling, Panel Data Models

JEL Classification: G14, G35, G36