The Firm-Level Credit Multiplier

51 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2012 Last revised: 25 Feb 2023

See all articles by Murillo Campello

Murillo Campello

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Dirk Hackbarth

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Date Written: February 2012

Abstract

We study the effect of asset tangibility on corporate financing and investment decisions. Financially constrained firms benefit the most from investing in tangible assets because those assets help relax constraints, allowing for further investment. Using a dynamic model, we characterize this effect - which we call firm-level credit multiplier - and show how asset tangibility increases the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q for financially constrained firms. Examining a large sample of manufacturers over the 1971-2005 period as well as simulated data, we find support for our theory's tangibility-investment channel. We further verify that our findings are driven by firms' debt issuance activities. Consistent with our empirical identification strategy, the firm-level credit multiplier is absent from samples of financially unconstrained firms and samples of financially constrained firms with low spare debt capacity.

Suggested Citation

Campello, Murillo and Hackbarth, Dirk, The Firm-Level Credit Multiplier (February 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w17805, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998603

Murillo Campello (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

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Dirk Hackbarth

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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