Corruption and Referee Bias in Football: The Case of Calciopoli

37 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2012

See all articles by Walter Distaso

Walter Distaso

Imperial College Business School

Leone Leonida

University of London; University of Messina

Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti

University of Essex; University of Messina

Pietro Navarra

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance; London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS

Date Written: February 13, 2012

Abstract

Based on the Calciopoli scandal, which uncovered widespread corruption in Italian football, this paper quantifies the effect of referee bias on the performance of football teams. The impartiality of referees is often distorted by external factors which exert some emotional pressure in order to influence their decisions. On the other hand, corrupt referees consciously and deliberately try to distort the results of the sport contest, in order to favor the corrupting teams. Building on the implications of a model where performance in a sport contest depends on both effort and bribing, our results highlight the different effects of these two forms of bias, and help to shed light on several aspects of the corruption scandal.

Keywords: referee bias, contest success function, economics of sport

JEL Classification: C73, C35, L83

Suggested Citation

Distaso, Walter and Leonida, Leone and Maimone Ansaldo Patti, Dario and Maimone Ansaldo Patti, Dario and Navarra, Pietro, Corruption and Referee Bias in Football: The Case of Calciopoli (February 13, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2004385 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2004385

Walter Distaso (Contact Author)

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Leone Leonida

University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

University of Messina ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti, 1
Messina, 98122
Italy

Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

University of Messina

Piazza Pugliatti, 1
Messina, Messina 981223
Italy
+39090719202 (Phone)
+39090719202 (Fax)

Pietro Navarra

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti 1
Messina
Sicilia, 98122
Italy
39-090-676-4446 (Phone)
39-090-292-0014 (Fax)

London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
44-207-955-6820 (Phone)

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