Electoral Rules and Voter Turnout

40 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2012

See all articles by Guglielmo Barone

Guglielmo Barone

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Guido de Blasio

Bank of Italy

Date Written: November 23, 2011

Abstract

The paper investigates the effect of electoral rules on voter turnout. It focuses on Italian municipalities, where voting schemes are differentiated by the size of the city: a single ballot system applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dual ballot system is in place above that threshold. By exploiting this discontinuity, the paper finds that the dual ballot increases participation at the local polls, with an estimated effect of about 1 percentage point. The increase in voter turnout is associated with wider political representation, politicians of higher quality, greater fiscal discipline, and more robust local development. Finally, we document that the higher political participation triggered by local electoral rules extends to nationwide voting contexts.

Keywords: voter turnout, electoral systems, regression discontinuity design

JEL Classification: D72, H73

Suggested Citation

Barone, Guglielmo and de Blasio, Guido, Electoral Rules and Voter Turnout (November 23, 2011). Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 833, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2009890 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2009890

Guglielmo Barone

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

Guido De Blasio (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
00184 Roma
Italy

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