Hiring Costs of Skilled Workers and the Supply of Firm-Provided Training

31 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2012

See all articles by Marc Blatter

Marc Blatter

University of Bern

Samuel Muehlemann

University of Bern

Samuel Schenker

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Stefan C. Wolter

Swiss Coordination Centre for Research in Education (SKBF); University of Bern - Department of Economics

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the costs of hiring skilled workers from the external labor market affect a firm's supply of training. Using administrative survey data with detailed information on hiring and training costs for Swiss firms, we find evidence for substantial and increasing marginal hiring costs. However, firms can invest in internal training of unskilled workers and thereby avoid costs for external hiring. Controlling for a firm's training investment, we find that a one standard deviation increase in average external hiring costs increases the number of internal training positions by 0.7 standard deviations.

Keywords: hiring costs, apprenticeship training, firm-sponsored training

JEL Classification: J23, J24, J32

Suggested Citation

Blatter, Marc and Mühlemann, Samuel and Schenker, Samuel and Wolter, Stefan C., Hiring Costs of Skilled Workers and the Supply of Firm-Provided Training. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6344, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010939 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2010939

Marc Blatter (Contact Author)

University of Bern ( email )

Gesellschaftsstrasse 49
Bern, BERN 3001
Switzerland

Samuel Mühlemann

University of Bern ( email )

Gesellschaftstrasse 49
Bern, CH-3012
Switzerland

Samuel Schenker

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Stefan C. Wolter

Swiss Coordination Centre for Research in Education (SKBF) ( email )

CH - 5000 Aarau
Switzerland
+41 62 835 23 90 (Phone)
+41 62 835 23 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.skbf-csre.ch

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Gesellschaftstrasse 49
Bern, CH-3012
Switzerland
+41 31 631 40 95 (Phone)
+41 31 631 39 92 (Fax)

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