On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games

Posted: 12 Mar 2012

See all articles by Yosef Rinott

Yosef Rinott

Independent

Marco Scarsini

Luiss University Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza

Date Written: March, 11 2012

Abstract

How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. In this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results.

Keywords: pure Nash equilibria, random games, Stein method

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Rinott, Yosef and Scarsini, Marco, On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games (March, 11 2012). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019817

Yosef Rinott

Independent ( email )

Marco Scarsini (Contact Author)

Luiss University Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, RM 00197
Italy

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