The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance: Do the Media Influence Managers’ Decisions to Abandon Acquisition Attempts?

61 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2012 Last revised: 6 Dec 2012

See all articles by Baixiao Liu

Baixiao Liu

Peking University HSBC Business School

John J. McConnell

Purdue University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 8, 2012

Abstract

Using 636 large acquisition attempts that are accompanied by a negative stock price reaction at their announcement (“value-reducing acquisition attempts”) from 1990-2010, we find that, in deciding whether to abandon a value-reducing acquisition attempt, managers’ sensitivity to the firm’s stock price reaction during the announcement period is influenced by the level and the tone of media attention to the proposed transaction. We interpret the results to imply that managers have reputational capital at risk in making corporate capital allocation decisions and that the level and tone of media attention heighten the impact of a value-reducing acquisition on the manager’s reputational capital. To the extent that value-reducing acquisition attempts are more likely to be abandoned, the media can play a role in aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests.

Keywords: Acquisition, Abandon, Capital allocation, Corporate governance, Media attention, Media tone, Reputational capital

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Liu, Baixiao and McConnell, John J., The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance: Do the Media Influence Managers’ Decisions to Abandon Acquisition Attempts? (June 8, 2012). AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2024082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024082

Baixiao Liu

Peking University HSBC Business School ( email )

John J. McConnell (Contact Author)

Purdue University ( email )

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