Copyright, Evidence and Lobbynomics: The World after the UK's Hargreaves Review

36 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2012

See all articles by Benjamin Hav Mitra-Kahn

Benjamin Hav Mitra-Kahn

Government of the Commonwealth of Australia - IP Australia

Date Written: December 31, 2011

Abstract

This paper tries to convey the problems we government economists face in weighing up the evidence around copyright policy, and how the academic and grey literature plays a role in this. This is with particular reference to the recent review of the IP framework in the UK — the Hargreaves Review — and the reforms which are now being planned. The paper outlines the proposed changes and tries to raise the research questions which will need to be answered for Government to take these reforms forward. My primary aim in this paper is to emphasise that we are looking for help in gathering this evidence, and secondly to show that the institutions of Government can make it very hard for us civil servants to find all the relevant answers, as we often don’t know who to ask, or have the time to ask. I try to illustrate this by going through one aspect of the evidence we believe we have, and look in some detail at a very influential piece of ‘lobbynomics’ on the cost of infringement. The purpose of this is to share the view from the other side of the policy debate, and to invite the reader inside the bubble that can be government policy making, all the while trying to get out of said bubble.

Suggested Citation

Mitra-Kahn, Benjamin Hav, Copyright, Evidence and Lobbynomics: The World after the UK's Hargreaves Review (December 31, 2011). Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 65-100, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2024587

Benjamin Hav Mitra-Kahn (Contact Author)

Government of the Commonwealth of Australia - IP Australia ( email )

PO Box 200
Woden, ACT 2606
United States

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