Are the Bailouts of Wall Street Complements or Substitutes?
33 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2012 Last revised: 3 Sep 2012
Date Written: March 21, 2012
Abstract
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) lent $2.3 trillion worth of general collateral to eighteen investment houses in exchange for riskier securities. Treasury collateral was in high demand in 2008 and 2009 as repo markets shunned lower quality collateral. This paper finds a negative and significant relationship between participating in the TSLF and having funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other Federal Reserve lending programs. Thus, it appears that the TSLF was a substitute for other bailouts. In addition, dealers with higher paid CEOs were more likely to borrow in the next TSLF auction cycle.
Keywords: bailout, Capital Purchase Program (CPP), CEO pay, Dodd–Frank emergency lending, Federal Reserve, financial crisis, general collateral, investment banks, primary dealers, repos, section 13(3), securities dealers, Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)
JEL Classification: G01, G18, G2, G24, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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