A Theory of State Censorship

29 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2012 Last revised: 20 Jul 2012

See all articles by Mehdi Shadmehr

Mehdi Shadmehr

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy

Dan Bernhardt

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 21, 2012

Abstract

We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey public information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (1) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium calculations ignore that censoring less causes citizens to update more positively following no news; (2) a ruler gains from higher censorship costs if and only if censorship costs exceed a critical threshold; (3) a bad ruler prefers a very active media to a very passive one, while a good ruler prefers the opposite.

Keywords: Censorship, Media Freedom, Public Signal, Information Manipulation, Protest, Revolution, Regime Change

Suggested Citation

Shadmehr, Mehdi and Bernhardt, Dan, A Theory of State Censorship (March 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2027052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2027052

Mehdi Shadmehr (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy ( email )

Abernathy Hall
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3435
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mehdishadmehr.com

Dan Bernhardt

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-244-5708 (Phone)

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