The Commission’s New SGEI Package: The Rules for State Aid and the Compensation of Services of General Economic Interest

12 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2012

See all articles by Wolf Sauter

Wolf Sauter

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Faculty of Law; Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM)

Date Written: April 23, 2012

Abstract

In December 2011 the European Commission updated its original SGEI package of 2005 in which it spelled out under which conditions public service compensation constituted aid but was compatible with the internal market. As such both versions of the Package complement the 2003 Altmark ruling of the European Court of Justice which outlined the four conditions under which compensation would not be considered to form aid in the first place. The new regime seeks to distinguish on the one hand generally compatible social services (such as healthcare and social housing) and on the other the utilities where individual exemption decisions are believed to be more frequently required. Compared to the 2005 version there is now also more emphasis on efficiency and the use of public procurement procedures and more detail on what constitutes acceptable costs and a reasonable rate of return.

Keywords: EU law, state aid, services of general economic interest, public service

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L43, L44

Suggested Citation

Sauter, Wolf and Sauter, Wolf, The Commission’s New SGEI Package: The Rules for State Aid and the Compensation of Services of General Economic Interest (April 23, 2012). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2044680 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2044680

Wolf Sauter (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Faculty of Law ( email )

Netherlands

Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) ( email )

PO Box 16326
2500 BH The Hague
Netherlands

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