Risk and the Evolution of Human Exchange

Proceedings of the Royal Society, doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.2614

Posted: 27 Apr 2012

See all articles by Hillard S. Kaplan

Hillard S. Kaplan

University of New Mexico - Program in Interdisciplinary

Eric Schniter

Center for the Study of Human Nature - CSUF; Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics - Economic Science Institute

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law

Bart J. Wilson

Chapman University - Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy; Chapman University - Economic Science Institute (ESI); Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law

Date Written: April 18, 2012

Abstract

Compared with other species, exchange among non-kin is a hallmark of human sociality in both the breadth of individuals and total resources involved. One hypothesis is that extensive exchange evolved to buffer the risks associated with hominid dietary specialization on calorie dense, large packages, especially from hunting. ‘Lucky’ individuals share food with ‘unlucky’ individuals with the expectation of reciprocity when roles are reversed. Cross-cultural data provide prima facie evidence of pair-wise reciprocity and an almost universal association of high-variance (HV) resources with greater exchange. However, such evidence is not definitive; an alternative hypothesis is that food sharing is really ‘tolerated theft’, in which individuals possessing more food allow others to steal from them, owing to the threat of violence from hungry individuals. Pair-wise correlations may reflect proximity providing greater opportunities for mutual theft of food. We report a laboratory experiment of foraging and food consumption in a virtual world, designed to test the risk-reduction hypothesis by determining whether people form reciprocal relationships in response to variance of resource acquisition, even when there is no external enforcement of any transfer agreements that might emerge. Individuals can forage in a high-mean, HV patch or a low-mean, low-variance (LV) patch. The key feature of the experimental design is that individuals can transfer resources to others. We find that sharing hardly occurs after LV foraging, but among HV foragers sharing increases dramatically over time. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that people are pre-disposed to evaluate gains from exchange and respond to unsynchronized variance in resource availability through endogenous reciprocal trading relationships.

Keywords: cooperation, exchange, hunter–gatherers, risk, evolution

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Hillard S. and Schniter, Eric and Smith, Vernon L. and Wilson, Bart J., Risk and the Evolution of Human Exchange (April 18, 2012). Proceedings of the Royal Society, doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.2614, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2046825

Hillard S. Kaplan (Contact Author)

University of New Mexico - Program in Interdisciplinary ( email )

107 Humanitites Building
Albuquerque, NM 87131-1221
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pibbs.unm.edu/

Eric Schniter

Center for the Study of Human Nature - CSUF ( email )

800 N. State College Blvd.
Fullerton, CA 92831-3599
United States

Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/ericschniter/

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2830 (Phone)

Chapman University School of Law ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States

Bart J. Wilson

Chapman University - Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States
(714) 628-7306 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bartjwilson.com

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute (ESI) ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States
(714) 628-7306 (Phone)

Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States
(714) 628-7306 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bartjwilson.com

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