Exclusivity in High-Tech Industries: Evidence from the French Case

European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 163-181, 2012

19 Pages Posted: 20 May 2012 Last revised: 8 Aug 2023

See all articles by Patrice Bougette

Patrice Bougette

Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG

Frédéric M. Marty

Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) / Université Nice Sophia Antipolis; OFCE; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

Julien Pillot

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG)

Patrice Reis

Law, Economics, and Management Research Group

Date Written: April 1, 2012

Abstract

The iPhone exclusivity deal illustrates the complex issue of exclusive arrangements in high-tech industries. Previous law cases on broadcasting right restrictions also highlighted the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure through such contractual clauses. This paper questions the French competition authorities’ decisions in the light of economic analysis. If such exclusive agreements foster incentives to invest and innovate, they may also be considered as exclusionary practices.

Keywords: Exclusive agreements, Vertical restraints, Antitrust remedies, High-Tech industries, French case law

JEL Classification: K21, L42

Suggested Citation

Bougette, Patrice and Marty, Frédéric M. and Pillot, Julien and Reis, Patrice, Exclusivity in High-Tech Industries: Evidence from the French Case (April 1, 2012). European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 163-181, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2057214

Patrice Bougette (Contact Author)

Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG ( email )

GREDEG CNRS
250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/patricebougette/Home

Frédéric M. Marty

Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) / Université Nice Sophia Antipolis ( email )

250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France

HOME PAGE: http://hp.gredeg.cnrs.fr/marty/

OFCE ( email )

69 Quai d'Orsay
Paris 75004
France

Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) ( email )

2020 rue University, 25th floor
Montreal H3C 3J7, Quebec
Canada

Julien Pillot

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG) ( email )

250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France

Patrice Reis

Law, Economics, and Management Research Group ( email )

250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France

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