Liability Driven Investment with Downside Risk

28 Pages Posted: 25 May 2012 Last revised: 16 Oct 2012

See all articles by Andrew Ang

Andrew Ang

BlackRock, Inc

Bingxu Chen

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance

Suresh M. Sundaresan

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 16, 2012

Abstract

We develop a liability driven investment framework that incorporates downside risk penalties for not meeting liabilities. The shortfall between the asset and liabilities can be valued as an option which swaps the value of the endogenously determined optimal portfolio for the value of the liabilities. The optimal portfolio selection exhibits endogenous risk aversion and as the funding ratio deviates from the fully funded case in both directions, effective risk aversion decreases. When funding is low, the manager “swings for the fences” to take on risk, betting on the chance that liabilities can be covered. Over-funded plans also can afford to take on more risk as liabilities are already well covered and so invest aggressively in risky securities.

Keywords: Liability Driven Investment (LDI) , Asset Allocation, Pension, Downside Risk, Expected Shortfall

Suggested Citation

Ang, Andrew and Chen, Bingxu and Sundaresan, Suresh M., Liability Driven Investment with Downside Risk (October 16, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2065890 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2065890

Andrew Ang

BlackRock, Inc ( email )

55 East 52nd Street
New York City, NY 10055
United States

Bingxu Chen (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Suresh M. Sundaresan

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-4423 (Phone)
212-316-9180 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ssundaresan/

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